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Agricultural Trade Policy in Belgium, 1875-1900  
 Abstract	  
After 1875, cheap grain from the United States and Russia flooded the 
European markets. Many countries like Germany, France, and Sweden 
turned to agricultural trade protection, while others, like the UK and 
Denmark, held on to a free trade position. Belgium adopted a middle 
position, leaving its grain markets open but protecting animal husbandry, 
dairy production, and the processing of foodstuffs. The econometric 
analysis of the votes of Belgian Members of Parliament on four proposals 
to install protectionist measures on agricultural trade seeks to identify 
which economic or political interests explain the Belgian policy option. 
 
Introduction	  
The abolition of protectionist corn laws in all European countries, after 1846, heralded 
a period of agricultural free trade. By the late 1870s, the agricultural invasion set this 
policy under severe pressure in most European countries. The massive import of 
wheat, in particular from Russia and the US, led to a price fall in these products and 
sparked a renewed demand for agricultural protection by corn producers. On the other 
hand, the industrial depression starting in the 1870s drove industrial producers to seek 
protection for industrial products. These elements brought, combined with local 
political factors such as the Kulturkampf in Germany, electoral victories to 
conservative political parties favouring the imposition of trade tariffs. In Germany, 
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the elections of 1878 resulted in a government that imposed the protectionist tariff law 
of 1879. In France, the Republican government adjusted its agricultural trade policy 
starting from 1881 (Aldenhoff-Hübinger 2005). In 1888, after elections in 1887 
installed a protectionist government, Sweden followed suit by introducing tariffs on a 
number of agricultural and industrial products. Also, Italy, Spain, and the Austro-
Hungarian Empire returned to protection of their home markets. The United Kingdom 
and Denmark remained free trade oriented (Bairoch 1976 and 1986, Kindleberger 
1978, Tracy 1989, and Irwin 1994).  
The different reactions have raised questions on the determinants of agricultural 
tariffs in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Interest-based explanations were 
explored by Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1998), Sibylle Lehman (2010), and Lehman 
and Oliver Volckart (2011) to explain the German and Swedish return to 
protectionism. Kevin O’Rourke (1997) also finds many countries’ reactions to the 
agricultural invasion consistent with an interest-based account of trade policy 
formation. These interest-based explanations, using the specific factors model and the 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, seem to work far better for this episode of tariff 
history than for the explanation of Corn Law Repeal in the United Kingdom 
(McKeown 1989, McLean and Bustani 1999, and Schonhardt-Bailey 2003 and 2006) 
and Belgium (Van Dijck and Truyts 2011) in the middle of the century. 
In this article, we study the Belgian partial return to agricultural protection in the 
1880s and 1890s as a test of interest-based explanations. Belgium is an interesting 
case for a number of reasons. First, Belgian tariff policy held a middle position 
between the countries that opted for protectionism and the countries that remained on 
a free trade course. Second, the Belgian economic structure was very close to the 
British one. The share of agriculture in GDP dropped from 37% in 1846 to 23.2% in 
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1880 and 15.84% in 1895 (Goossens 1992; Blomme 1992, p. 277). Yet unlike the 
UK, the outcome of trade policy formation in Belgium led to some protectionist 
measures. Third, like in Germany, France, and Sweden, the Belgian election of 1884 
brought the conservative Catholic party to power. The Liberal government was 
defeated after battles with the Catholic party and clergy over the position of religion 
in schools. This ‘school war’ was to some extent comparable to the Kulturkampf in 
Germany (Clark and Kaiser 2003). After 1884, with a clear majority in Parliament 
and with the agricultural interests agitating for protectionist tariffs, the conservative 
government only partially embraced a protectionist policy. Free trade for wheat and 
rye was upheld, while products from animal husbandry and food processing were 
protected by tariffs. Fourth, the strong statistical tradition of the country, dating back 
to the pioneering work of Adolphe Quetelet, provides data of exceptional quality and 
quantity at constituency level (‘arrondissement’). This material is used to make an in 
depth profile of the constituencies. 
We study why Belgium did not return to full-fledged agricultural protectionism after 
the conservative electoral victory in 1884, but rather chose a middle position between 
protectionist Europe (Germany, France, Sweden) and free trade Europe (UK, 
Denmark). How did the agricultural invasion and the industrial crisis affect trade 
policy? Previous qualitative research has analysed the Belgian tariff policy (Suetens 
1955, p. 110-116 and 126-135) and the position of the Catholic (Van Molle 1989 and 
2008) and Socialist parties (Craeybeckx 1973 and 1974; Hüberman 2008) towards the 
countryside and agricultural policy, but these studies have not systematically analyzed 
interest-based explanations of the Belgian tariff policy.1 We study the votes of the 
Belgian Members of Parliament on four proposals to reinstate trade protection. In our 
roll-call analysis, we analyse the relative importance of personal economic interests, 
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party politics, ideology, and the economic and demographic interests of 
Representatives’ constituencies as determinants of voting. 
 
Belgium’s	  trade	  policy	  1875-­‐1900	  
Around 1875, the price decline of wheat and rye on the world market became tangible 
in Belgium (Figure 1). The average wheat price between 1860 and 1870 was 30.35 
Belgian Franks for 100kg, while the five year average between 1868 and 1872 was as 
high as 31.6 fr/100kg. This dropped to a five year average around 1895 of 15.68 
fr/100kg (Gadisseur 1990, p. 756-761). Likewise, the price of rye was halved. The 
price of meat fell with 25%, and most products of animal husbandry fetched much 
lower prices. The agricultural interests in Belgium started to demand protectionist 
tariffs, a demand that became louder after the German adoption of protectionist tariffs 
in 1879. With prices decreasing further at the beginning of the 1880s and the national 
elections of 1884 coming closer, the cry for agricultural protection was voiced in 
Parliament by a number of Catholic politicians.  
 
Figure 1: Prices and import of wheat and rye 
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The elections of 10 June 1884 brought a large scale victory for the Catholic party. The 
agricultural crisis was one major election theme, but only one next to the budget, 
military policy, and the school war (Van Molle 1989; Lamberts and Lory 1986). The 
school war in particular was the major bone of contention. In 1879 and 1881 the 
Liberal government voted a law that extended and secularised the network of public 
schools. This led to a protracted polarization between Catholics and Liberals and to 
the foundation of a Federation of Catholic political organisations in 1884 (Wils 1986). 
After the electoral victory of June 1884, the Catholic party dominated Belgian 
Parliament up to the First World War . The Catholic government strengthend the 
network of Catholic schools in the subsequent years, making the polarisation of 
political life even stronger (Deneckere 2005, p. 477-500). 
After 1884 agricultural tariffs became an issue that was discussed continuously and 
intensely for over a decade. In the 1830s and 1840s, the Catholic party had been 
protectionist minded, but it had left this position for a free trade stance in the 1850s 
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and beyond (Van Dijck 2008; Van Dijck and Truyts 2011). When agricultural prices 
began to drop in the 1870s, it were Catholic party members that voiced a preference 
for tariffs to protect grain production and animal husbandry. The Catholic party was 
clearly stronger in the more rural districts in the north, while the political strongholds 
of the Liberals and later the Socialists were the cities and industrial centers of the 
provinces of Liège and Hainaut (De Smaele 2009). Yet, a substantial number of 
Catholic representatives, under the leadership of their prime minister August 
Beernaert, resisted agricultural tariffs. The majority of the Liberal representatives, and 
after 1894 the majority of the Socialists, defended a free trade policy (Craeybeckx 
1973 and 1974; Hüberman 2008). Within a year after the election of 1884, a group of 
four Catholic representatives consisting of Eugène Dumont, Jules de Burlet, Léon 
Pastur, and Georges Snoy proposed tariffs on livestock, meat, cereals and flour. 
Because of the evolution of the prices, so the submitters of the bill upheld, the value 
of agricultural lands was declining and so were the rents. On 10 July 1885 the House 
of Representatives rejected the two articles contained in this bill, proposing on the one 
hand tariffs for cereals and on the other hand tariffs on live animals and meat (Van 
Molle 1989, p. 132).  
A number of Catholic representatives insisted on demanding agricultural tariffs after 
July 1885. Dumont, de Burlet, Pastur and Snoy introduced a new bill on 15 December 
1885, which was defended by a group of Catholic representatives and the Catholic 
minister of agriculture. However, this new bill did not include tariffs on wheat and 
rye. From now on the debate centered on tariffs on animals and meat. Although the 
Catholic prime minister, Beernaert, and a number of Catholic representatives objected 
tariffs for livestock and meat, this proposal eventually led to the law of 18 June 1887, 
which raised moderate tariffs for livestock and meat (Suetens 1955, p. 116; Van 
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Molle, 1989, p. 129-133). The discussion on the bill only started in April 1887, as 
political life was interrupted by riots in the industrial centers in March 1886. The 
reaction of the police and army left 28 laborers dead. The riots had as a consequence, 
besides the start of a hesitating social policy, that tariffs on breadgrains could easily 
be depicted as a misery tax that would cause land rents to rise. This would only be in 
the interest of the landed classes (Suetens 1955, p. 115). After 1886 no further 
legislative initiative was taken to introduce taxes on basic breadgrains.  
Between 1890 and 1894, different bills or amendments were introduced to expand the 
protectionist measures, but it never came to a vote for various political reasons (Van 
Molle 1989, p. 134-136). This changed after March 1894  when the free trade minded 
prime minister Beernaert was replaced by de Burlet, one of the architects of the 
protectionist proposals in 1885 and the law of 1887 after political differences in the 
Catholic party over the tariff question and the reform of the franchise. This and the 
electoral victory of October 1894 opened the way for the general tariff law of 12 July 
1895.  
The election of 14 October 1894 was the first election in Belgian history with general 
male franchise.The agricultural crisis was a major election theme because the 
Catholics feared that the Socialists would pilfer the farmers’ votes. Both the Liberals 
and the Socialists sought a clear position towards the farming population (Craeybeckx 
1973 and 1974). However, the Catholics secured an owerwhelming majority in 1894 
(104 out of 152 seats) with a number of policy measures aimed specifically at the 
countryside (Van Molle 2008). The Liberals only retained 20 seats in the Lowerhouse 
out of 61 before the election and for the first time in Belgian history, 28 Socialist 
representatives entered Partliament (Luykx 1985, p. 178 and 208).  
 9 
The ensuing general tariff law of 12 July 1895 did not introduce tariffs for grain, a 
subject that remained taboo in Parliament, despite the Catholic farmers organisations 
agitating strongly for grain tariffs. Neither did it increase the tariffs on livestock and 
meat. The law of 1895 did introduce tariffs on cacao, canned foodstuffs, honey, fresh 
and dried fruits, cream and milk, gingerbread, flour, pasta, butter and margarine, a 
number of luxury goods (such as saffron, foie gras, and truffles), and finally one kind 
of cereal: oats. The law also provided protectionist tariffs for a number of textiles, 
clothing, tapestry, books, cast iron and ironware, musical instruments, leatherware, 
watches, hides, perfumes, soap, and so on (Moniteur belge 14 July 1895, p. 2553-
2560). The general idea of the protectionist laws of 1887 and 1895 was to orient 
Belgian agriculture towards the fattening up of livestock, dairy production, fruit and 
vegetables, and the processing of food. These products and activities were more suited 
to the Belgian agricultural structure, dominated by small farms, and provided for a 
higher added value (Van Molle 2008, p. 164).  
 
The	  winners	  and	  losers	  of	  free	  trade:	  research	  hypotheses	  
Our econometric analysis understands a Member of Parliament’s preferences in the 
votes on the two proposals of 1885 and the laws of 1887 and 1895 as a trade-off 
between his personal convictions and party affiliation, his personal economic 
interests, and the interests of his constituency, which he must serve to ensure re-
election. O’Rourke 1997, Schonhardt-Bailey 1998, and Lehman 2010 have explained 
the typical theoretical framework, the specific factors and the Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson models, used to formulate hypotheses about the interests of the different 
players in the choice of trade policy. We confront this framework with the Belgian 
economic structure to formulate our research hypotheses. 
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The specific factors model holds that labor is immobile between sectors (specific) and 
that therefore the workers and employers in a certain sector have the same sectoral 
interest. If so, then sectoral interests can be determined from trade balances. Figure 2 
depicts the Belgian trade balance for the period 1860-1910 for seven goods and shows 
which sectors were exporting and which were import-competing. In the second half of 
the nineteenth century, Belgium became an importer of foodstuffs and an exporter of 
industrial products. The wheat producers were most severely hit by the agricultural 
invasion. Livestock had a small net shortage. The self-sufficiency for bread grains 
plummeted from 62.6% in 1880 to 27.8% in 1910, while the self-sufficiency for meat 
increased from 85.4% to 95.6% (Blomme 1992, p. 282). Based on the agricultural 
trade balances, livestock and wheat producers would be expected to favor 
protectionism very strongly. 
Figure 2: Trade balance 1860-1910: net export (in 1000 fr.) 
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On the other hand, Figure 2 shows that Belgium had a number of strong industrial 
exporting sectors: machines, iron and steel, and primary products such as coal. We 
expect these industries to be in favor of free trade. Belgium had been strong in 
textiles, but this sector slowly turned from exporting to import-competing, and would 
therefore have shifted from a free trade position to favoring protectionism in the first 
five years of the 1890s. The recovery of the textile sector after 1895 may itself have 
been the result of the imposed import tariffs.  
However, a number of migration researchers have shown that labor was mobile. As 
the wages were higher in industry, a number of land laborers migrated from the 
countryside to the industrial centers (Schepens 1973; Stengers 1978; Goddeeris and 
Hermans 2012). The development of the Belgian industrial sector meant that labor 
could find an alternative income outside agriculture. The absolute number of farmers 
remained stable around 775,000 between the middle of the century and 1896, but the 
relative importance of agricultural employment dropped quickly from just under 50% 
in 1846 to about 25% around 1900 (Klep 1976; Blomme 1992). After the end of the 
industrial crisis around 1895, the employment in the agricultural sector also 
descended in absolute terms (De Brabander 1983, p. 36, 46 and annex B; De Moor 
2001). The number of land laborers decreased from 180,000 in 1880 to 161,000 in 
1910. As this indicates a certain amount of sectoral mobility, the laborers would be 
expected to be in favor of free trade. This is consistent with the viewpoint of the 
Socialists and liberal progressivists as described by Jan Craeybeckx (1973, p. 228) 
and Michael Hüberman (2008). 
Because labor was to a certain extent mobile, we have a closer look at the Heckscher-
Ohlin-Samuelson model. The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model understands 
differences in the relative scarcity of various production factors as an important 
 12 
motivation for international trade. Countries can produce goods more cheaply when 
this production intensively uses relatively abundant production factors. Countries will 
export such goods, and import goods produced predominantly with more scarce 
factors. Trade thus stimulates demand for abundant production factors and reduces 
demand for relatively scarce factors. Therefore, trade benefits owners of the former 
and harms owners of the latter. We then particularly expect owners of relatively 
scarce production factors to request trade protection. 
In Belgium capital and labor were the relatively abundant factors. Labor, being 
mobile, would generally be in favor of free trade. As capital was relatively abundant 
in Belgium, the most capital intensive heavy industries, such as coal, steel, and 
machine building, would be in favor of free trade. However, the position of the 
owners of textile companies, an activity that was much less capital intensive, is 
unclear.  
Relatively speaking, steamships and the development of large-scale agriculture in the 
U.S. and Russia made land much more scarce in Belgium. Indeed, one of the main 
effects of the agricultural invasion was the lowering of the value and rent of land 
(O’Rourke 1997). In Belgium, the rents dropped in a spectacular manner between 
1870 and 1895. In real terms, Belgian leases went down on average with 23% 
(Vanhaute 2001, p. 31 and 34). This indicates that landowners would be in favor of 
protection - in particular those in the constituencies with the largest share of wheat 
growing. We divide all constituencies into four quartiles according to the share of 
agricultural land used for growing wheat. Figure 3 depicts the evolution of the 
average lease prices of agricultural land for these four quartiles and illustrates how 
lease prices were higher where the land allowed for more wheat production. Most 
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important for our analysis, Figure 3 shows that the decline in lease prices was the 
steepest in constituencies specialized in growing wheat.  
 
Figure 3: Average lease prices of fields (quartiles in % agricultural land for wheat in 
1866)   
	   
But what was the position of the small farmers who received voting rights in 1893?  
Lehman (2010, p. 151-152 and 154) and Schonhardt-Bailey (1998, p. 302) argue that 
the policy preference of the agricultural sector was not homogenous, but depended on 
farm size and specialization. It would be rational for large farms, specialized in land-
intensive products such as grain, to be in favor of protectionism. For small farms 
specialized in labor intensive products, such as fruits and vegetables, or less land-
intensive products, such as livestock and dairy products, it would be rational to be in 
favor of free trade. The Belgian agricultural structure was one of smallholdings where 
population pressure, the equal division of inheritances, and the division of land into 
smaller units by landlords accelerated the fragmentation of farms in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. In 1895 ca. 635,000 farms (76.5% of all farms) were smaller 
than 2 hectare. Vanhaute estimated that 2 ha was the limit to make a distinction 
between households in which farming provided a sub-income and real commercial 
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agricultural exploitations (Vanhaute 1993). In 1880, 472,000 farms were even smaller 
than 0.5 ha. These smallholdings produced almost exclusively for their own needs and 
only brought occasional surpluses to the market (Segers and Van Molle 2004, p. 56). 
The average farm size in Belgium was 2.3 hectare, much smaller than Denmark (14 
ha), Great-Britain (12 ha), or Germany (6 ha). According to Vanhaute (2001) 
exploitations smaller than 20 ha accounted for two thirds of the agricultural area. It 
should follow from this structure that a large share of Belgian agriculture would be in 
favor of free trade. The country counted less than 4,000 farms that were bigger than 
50 hectare. These were concentrated in the heavy clay region that ran south of 
Brussels from the west of the country to Liège in the east (districts of Tournai, Ath, 
Soignies, Nivelles, Gembloux, and Waremme). It would be expected that farmers in 
these districts would be in favor of protection. 
 
The	  Research	  Data	  	  
We have collected data on Representatives’ voting behavior, party affiliation, and 
personal economic background, as well as on the economic, demographic, and 
agricultural profile of their constituencies. The Representatives’ votes in the four roll-
call votes were collected from the published parliamentary procedures (Annales 
Parlementaires de la Chambre des Représentants, 10 July 1885, p. 1521-1522; 10 May 
1887, p. 1091-1092, and 25 June 1895, p. 1954). We only consider votes that were 
actually cast, and disregard the absentees. The party affiliations of the Representatives 
were recovered from the main published biographical dictionaries of the Belgian 
Parliament (De Paepe and Raindorf-Gerard 1996; Van Molle 1972). The dummy 
variables CATH, LIB, and SOC indicate respectively membership of the Catholic, 
Liberal, and Socialist party.2 Finally, the dummy variable OTH indicates membership 
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of a variety of fringe groups and independent Representatives. Figure 4 presents the 
party affiliation and voting behavior of the different MP’s in the four successive 
votes. Note that, contrary to the Socialist party in 1895, party discipline within both 
the Catholic and Liberal party was rather weak. In particular, the division among 
Catholic Representatives is a prime explanation for the two 1885 proposals being 
voted down. 
 
Figure 4: Party affiliation and voting behavior in the four votes 
 
 
The personal interests and professional background of the Representatives were 
retrieved from the main biographical dictionaries of the Belgian Parliament and of 
other Belgian institutions (Schepens 1976; Stengers 1975; Lehoucq and Valcke 1993; 
Kurgan-Van Hentenrijk 1996; Caulier-Mathy 1996; De Paepe, and Raindorf-Gerard 
1885a 1885b 
 CATH LIB SOC OTH total  CATH LIB SOC OTH total 
Abstention 2 6 0 0 8 Abstention 0 0 0 0 0 
Protection 36 3 0 0 39 Protection 38 5 0 0 43 
Free trade 19 25 0 9 53 Free trade 21 30 0 9 60 
total 57 34 0 9 100 Total 59 35 0 9 103 
1887 1895 
 CATH LIB SOC OTH total  CATH LIB SOC OTH total 
Abstention 2 0 0 3 5 Abstention 5 0 0 0 5 
Protection 62 4 0 3 69 Protection 74 3 1 0 78 
Free trade 12 36 0 6 54 Free trade 19 15 29 1 64 
Total 76 40 0 12 128 total 98 18 30 1 147 
Table: voting by party 
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1996). The dummy variable PERAGT indicates personal interests in the agricultural 
sector as large landowner or agricultural professional. Large landownership was 
derived from the lists of voters eligible for the Senate. Eligibility for the Senate 
required a very high level of taxes paid, which could in practice only be achieved by 
large landowners. Furthermore, Representatives with a professional background as 
agricultural industrialists, traders in agricultural machinery or membership of the 
advisory agricultural commissions, officials of the farmers movement, and 
veterinaries are designated as having agricultural interests. Figure 5 depicts the overall 
percentage of Representatives having agricultural (and other) interests for each of the 
four votes. Figure 6 presents voting of Representatives with and without agricultural 
interests, and illustrates that Representatives with agricultural interests are more likely 
to support agricultural trade protections.  
 
Figure 5: Percentage of Representatives having agricultural and other personal 
interests  
  1885a 1885b 1887 1895 
PERAGT 35.87% 33.98% 34.96% 23.24% 
PERINDHE 16.30% 16.50% 16.26% 14.79% 
PERINTEL 44.57% 47.57% 47.15% 52.11% 
PERPUB 13.04% 17.48% 20.33% 13.38% 
PERINDTE 3.26% 2.91% 4.07% 5.63% 
 
The dummy variable PERINDHE represents personal interests in the heavy industry 
and collects Representatives functioning as board members in the heavy industry 
(mining, iron and steel, machine building, glass…). The second panel of Figure 6 
presents voting according to interests in the heavy industry. The dummy variable 
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PERINTEL collects representatives with an explicitly intellectual professional 
background. This category collects teachers, university professors, scholarship 
commissioners, notaries, lawyers, judges, public prosecutors, journalists, writers, 
bankers, accountants, civil servants, medical doctors, and pharmacists. Note that for 
instance, industrialists may or may not have finished a higher education, but unless 
they also maintain any of the abovementioned positions, they are not considered to 
have an intellectual professional background. The third panel of Figure 6 depicts 
voting by intellectual profession. The dummy variable PERPUB is 1 for all 
representatives with a personal background in the public sector. This category 
comprises employees of the National Bank, teachers, university professors, mayors, 
judges, police commissioners, public prosecutors, and civil servants.3 The fourth 
panel of Figure 6 represents voting of representatives by background in the public 
sector. Finally, the dummy variable PERINDTE indicates personal interests in the 
textiles industry, and collects Representatives who owned cotton, wool or linen 
industries or worked as tailors. The last panel of Figure 6 represents voting of 
Representatives in the textiles industry.  
 
Figure 5: Personal interests and voting 
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In order to identify to what extent MP’s represent their constituencies’ interests, we 
have collected data on the economic, demographic, and agricultural characteristics of 
their constituencies. The industrial and demographic profile of each of the 41 
constituencies is reconstructed by means of the population and industrial censuses of 
1890. The variable popden represents the population density of each constituency. 
The variable proindr represents the share of the professional population working in 
the heavy industry (coal, iron and steel, machines and glass). The variable protexr 
represents the share of the professional population working in the textiles industry. 
The summary statistics of these variables (unweighted for the constituencies’ number 
of Representatives) are presented in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 6: Descriptive statistics of the constituency variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
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livestock (in 1885) 53,910.28 24,698.61 20,568 12,4339.7 
livestock (in 1895) 63,008.61 28,972.04 22,868 153,959 
cerealr (in 1885) 0.22 0.15 0.01 0.54 
cerealr (in 1895) 0.20 0.10 0.02 0.33 
Popden 2.22 1.51 0.37 6.53 
proindr 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.43 
Protexr 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.28 
studcatr 0.63 0.21 0.31 0.96 
 Observations : 41  
 
The agricultural profile of each constituency is further characterized by data from the 
agricultural censuses of 1880 and 1895. Throughout the period 1880-1895, Belgian 
agriculture was rapidly changing in reaction to the agricultural invasion. For this 
reason, we characterize the agricultural profile of the 41 constituencies by linearly 
interpolating between the census data of 1880 and 1895. The variable cerealr 
represents the share of a constituency’s agricultural surface used for growing wheat 
and rye. The variable livestock reflects number of cows and pigs in a constituency. 
Figure 7 presents the summary statistics of these variables for 1885 and 1895. Note 
how the increased livestock holdings illustrate the reorientation of Belgian agriculture 
toward meat and dairy production. The decreased share of agricultural land used for 
growing wheat and rye is reinforced by a general reduction in exploited agricultural 
land from 2.7 million ha in 1880 to 2.6 million ha in 1895.  
To capture the importance of the school struggle as a basis of party formation and 
political power, we characterize the educational profile of a constituency by the 
variable studcatr. This variable represents the share of primary school children 
enlisted in Catholic schools in the constituency and was retrieved from the 
educational census of 1880 (Malou 1881, p. 15-16). We believe that this variable 
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captures the strength of the network of Catholic organizations and the importance of 
Catholic opposition against the Liberal school policy in the different constituencies.  
 
Analysis	  of	  Representatives	  voting	  behavior	  
In the four votes, eighteen MP’s have abstained (eight for the first 1885 vote, none for 
the second, five in 1887, and five in 1895). We omit these abstentions from our 
analysis. Subsequently, the votes can be analyzed as a binary variable. We apply a 
probit analysis on each vote separately, to allow for maximal flexibility and to 
account for differences in the historical circumstances and in the voted proposals.4 
Figure 8 presents the marginal effects of a probit regression at the means, while taking 
a Representative’s party as well as personal and constituency interests into account.  
 
Figure 7: Probit marginal effects (at the mean) with party affiliation 
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First, party affiliation proves to be a very important predictor of voting. Keeping all 
else fixed at the mean, a Liberal Representative is on average respectively 97% and 
Dependent variable: Protectionist vote 
 1885a 1885b 1887 1895  
LIB (d) -0.97*** -0.94*** -0.97*** -0.54*** 
 (0.062) (0.073) (0.041) (0.15)  
OTH (d)   -0.57***  
   (0.20)  
SOC (d)    -0.58*** 
    (0.19)  
PERAGT (d) 0.33 0.055 0.28 0.027  
 (0.25) (0.20) (0.18) (0.22)  
PERINDHE (d) -0.47** -0.60*** -0.30 0.070  
 (0.23) (0.11) (0.31) (0.22)  
PERINTEL (d) -0.53** -0.49*** 0.17 -0.12  
 (0.25) (0.17) (0.19) (0.16)  
PERPUB (d) 0.86*** 0.40** 0.34** 0.15  
 (0.15) (0.20) (0.17) (0.34)  
PERINDTE (d)   0.42*** 0.15  
   (0.13) (0.48)  
cerealr 4.70* 3.27** 6.66*** 5.81*** 
 (2.58) (1.43) (1.71) (1.50)  
ln(livestock) 0.35 0.58** 0.28 -0.32  
 (0.38) (0.29) (0.37) (0.30)  
popden -0.45** -0.36*** -0.35*** -0.30*** 
 (0.21) (0.099) (0.099) (0.068)  
proindr 1.25 3.18* 0.21 -4.45  
 (3.36) (1.86) (1.50) (3.11)  
protexr 1.12 2.96* -0.95 0.89  
 (2.42) (1.62) (1.06) (1.44)  
studcatr -3.39* -2.36** -2.29* -1.76*  
 (1.88) (1.09) (1.28) (1.01)  
N 81 92 123 141 
pseudo R-sq 0.75 0.60 0.71 0.68  
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses 
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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94% less likely to support trade protection in the 1885 votes than a Catholic 
Representative. Likewise, the independent and Socialist MP’s are both statistically 
and historically significantly more likely to object trade protection in all four votes 
than the Catholics. 
Second, personal economic background is an important factor, except in 1895. 
Representatives with personal interests in agriculture are consistently more likely to 
support protection, although this effect is never statistically significantly different 
from 0 at the usual confidence levels. As theory predicts, personal interests in the 
heavy industry decrease ceteris paribus the likelihood of a protectionist vote, although 
this is only significant in the two 1885 votes - in other words before the Troubles of 
1886 and when only agricultural protection was at stake. MP’s with an intellectual 
professional background seem less prone to support protectionist measures. This 
possibly reflects an exposure to the free trade theories of political economy during 
their studies, although a number of economics textbooks at for instance the University 
of Leuven took on a more protectionist stance in the 1890s (Erreygers and Van Dijck 
2011). Representatives with a background in the public sector are, keeping all else 
constant, more inclined to prefer trade protection. MP’s with a background in the 
textiles industry are more supportive of protectionist measures, but this effect is only 
significant in 1887. 
Finally, the interests of Representatives’ constituencies are reflected in their voting. A 
larger share of agricultural land sowed with wheat and rye increases the likelihood of 
a protectionist vote significantly. A greater importance of livestock increases the 
likelihood of a protectionist vote, and statistically significantly so in the second vote 
of 1885, which proposes tariffs on meat imports. A greater population density 
decreases on average the support for trade protection. The share of the professional 
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population working in the heavy and textiles industry decreases the likelihood of a 
protectionist vote, although this effect disappears for textiles in the voting on the 
general tariff proposal of 1895, which included a substantial package of protectionist 
measures on textiles. Finally, a greater share of primary school children enrolled in 
Catholic schools consistently decreases ceteris paribus the likelihood of a 
protectionist vote.  
The interpretation of the coefficients in Figure 8 is somewhat confounded by the fact 
that the party affiliation of a constituency’s Representative already represents a 
constituency’s interests, as the constituents have likely elected a Representative which 
they believe best capable of serving their interests. Similarly, a Representative’s 
choice to adhere a certain party depends on his personal economic background. 
Although such multicollinearity does not invalidate our results, it can make 
interpretation more tedious. For this reason, Figure 9 presents the marginal effects (at 
the mean) of a probit regression which takes only personal and constituency interests 
into account.5  
 
Figure 8: Probit marginal effects (at the mean) without party affiliation 
Personal background and constituency interests 
Dependent variable: Protectionist vote 
 1885a 1885b 1887 1895  
PERAGT (d) 0.25 0.095 0.21 0.13  
 (0.19) (0.16) (0.13) (0.20)  
PERINDHE (d) -0.44*** -0.45*** -0.40* 0.26  
 (0.10) (0.080) (0.21) (0.19)  
PERINTEL (d) -0.30* -0.29** 0.10 -0.11  
 (0.18) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)  
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PERPUB (d) 0.35 0.17 0.18 0.37  
 (0.25) (0.17) (0.13) (0.28)  
PERINDTE (d)   0.19 0.088  
   (0.22) (0.37)  
cerealr 1.53 0.74 2.75*** 4.92*** 
 (1.17) (0.85) (0.82) (1.19)  
ln(livestock) 0.15 0.27* 0.78*** -0.13  
 (0.19) (0.16) (0.20) (0.20)  
popden -0.28*** -0.24*** -0.29*** -0.22*** 
 (0.076) (0.055) (0.053) (0.049)  
proindr -1.29 0.50 1.31 -5.99*** 
 (1.48) (1.12) (0.86) (1.67)  
protexr -2.74* -0.90 -1.90** 0.0018  
 (1.40) (0.99) (0.79) (1.08)  
studcatr -0.17 0.56 1.61*** -0.25  
 (0.61) (0.44) (0.51) (0.57)  
N 89 100 123 142  
pseudo R-sq 0.59 0.43 0.54 0.61  
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses 
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note first that the effect of personal interests is less pronounced when party affiliation 
is not controlled for. This suggests that party formation was not so much aligned 
around personal interest based preferences for trade policy. It does suggest that party 
affiliation in itself was an important predictor of trade policy preferences, independent 
of personal professional background, and that personal economic interests are an 
important factor in explaining Representative’s deviation from the party line.  
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Likewise, the effects of agricultural specialization in wheat and rye and of population 
density is less pronounced if one does not control for party affiliation. This can again 
indicate that the demographic and agricultural profile of a constituency is a relatively 
weak predictor of its Representative’s party affiliation, but that these can help to 
explain differences in voting within a party.  
This is no longer the case for the industrial profile of a constituency, however. The 
effects of employment in the heavy and textiles industry is mostly more negative if 
one does not control for party affiliation. The main industrial centers were 
traditionally Liberal party strongholds, and these constituencies’ preference for free 
trade in Figure 8 is absorbed by their Representatives’ Liberal party affiliation.  
Whereas the effect of the share of primary school children in Catholic schools was 
clearly negative if party affiliation is controlled for, this effect is mixed if the 
Representative’s party is omitted from the analysis. Constituencies with a greater 
importance of Catholic primary schools are more likely to elect a Catholic 
Representative. But Figure 4 already showed that the Catholic party was divided on 
the trade policy question in a free trade and a protectionist faction. Conditional on 
party membership, the effect of the school war intensity was clearly negative. This 
can suggest that the electoral basis of Catholic Representatives could take two 
substitute forms: the promotion of agricultural interests and the protection of the role 
of religion in education and society. The negative marginal effects of studcatr in 
Figure 8 can mean that in constituencies where the opposition against the Liberal 
school policy was fierce (larger share of children in Catholic schools), Catholic 
Representatives could rely on average more on the protection of religion in society to 
ensure reelection, and were as such less inclined to stand up for the agricultural 
interests.  
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Figure 4 shows that the division of the Catholic party between a free trade oriented 
faction and a protectionist faction as well as the changing balance of power between 
these factions are the key to understanding Belgium’s change in trade policy in the 
1880s and 1890s. Figure 10 illustrates the differences between the Catholic factions 
by depicting the conditional means of all explanatory variables, and compares these 
with the means in the Liberal party. In terms of personal interests, the Catholic free 
trade faction is clearly characterized by more outspoken heavy industry interests than 
the protectionist faction, and gathers, at least in 1885, more Representatives with 
intellectual professions. The protectionist Catholics are more prone to have personal 
agricultural interests and a public sector background. In terms of constituency 
background, the Catholic party’s free trade faction clearly stems from more densely 
populated constituencies. This is consistent with Craeybeckx’s (1973, p. 221) intuitive 
feeling on this divide on the Catholic side between the free trade group around prime 
minister Beernaert and the protectionists. In 1885, the Catholic free trade faction also 
still represents the textiles industry centers. Towards 1895, the Representatives of the 
textiles industry centers have moved towards the protectionist faction in the Catholic 
party. This, in combination with the extension of voting rights, led to a shift in the 
balance of power within the Catholic party, making the protectionist Catholic faction 
sufficiently strong to pass the laws of 1887 and 1895, as illustrated in Figure 4.  
  
Figure 9: conditional means Catholic factions and Liberals 
 1885a 1885b 
 
CATH : free 
traders 
CATH : 
protectionist LIB 
CATH : free 
traders 
CATH : 
protectionist LIB 
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PERAGT 28.57% 44.44% 35.29% 28.57% 42.11% 34.29% 
PERINDHE 19.05% 2.78% 26.47% 19.05% 2.63% 28.57% 
PERINTEL 61.9% 44.44% 44.18% 61.9% 47.37% 45.71% 
PERPUB 4.76% 16.67% 26.47% 14.29% 15.79% 25.71% 
PERINDTE 4.76% - 2.94% 4.76% - 2.86% 
cerealr 25.98% 23.40% 23.74% 25.08% 23.64% 23.58% 
ln(livestock) 10.76 11.00 10.88 10.79 10.98 10.89 
popden 3.14 1.80 3.39 3.26 1.87 3.46 
proindr 0.46% 2.36% 15.83% 0.59% 2.20% 16.05% 
protexr 7.76% 3.13% 5.81% 5.93% 4.00% 5.66% 
studcatr 81.54% 66.69% 45.94% 79.76% 67.86% 45.57% 
 1887 1895 
 
CATH : free 
traders 
CATH : 
protectionist LIB 
CATH : free 
traders 
CATH : 
protectionist LIB 
PERAGT 28.57% 40.32% 32.50% 12.50% 32.43% 16.67% 
PERINDHE 28.57% 3.23% 37.50% 20.83% 12.16% 5.56% 
PERINTEL 42.86% 51.61% 42.5% 45.83% 48.65% 72.22% 
PERPUB 14.29% 20.97% 22.50% - 13.51% 5.56% 
PERINDTE - 4.84% 2.50% 4.17% 6.76% - 
cerealr 20.57% 25.50% 20.31% 24.50% 26.16% 13.64% 
ln(livestock) 10.89 11.12 10.81 11.44 11.16 11.11 
popden 3.65 2.48 3.67 5.11 2.70 2.45 
proindr 3.69% 2.38% 18.06% 1.01% 0.93% 11.47% 
protexr 6.36% 5.69% 4.19% 2.47% 5.88% 0.92% 
studcatr 73.05% 69.21% 42.39% 65.67% 72.15% 37.86% 
 
Conclusions	  
The agricultural invasion and subsequent agricultural crisis as well as the resulting 
rise of protectionism in much of continental Europe, induced Belgium to a partial 
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reinstallation of tariffs on imports of agricultural products. Although the conservative 
Catholic party held a firm majority in Parliament, it was divided on the agricultural 
trade issue. A Catholic free trade faction mostly collected MP’s with a personal 
background in the heavy industry, representing on average more densely populated 
constituencies. The protectionist faction consisted more of Representatives with 
personal interests in agriculture and the public sector. In 1885, the Catholic free trade 
faction together with the Liberal Representatives was sufficiently large to vote down 
two proposals on the installation of tariffs on cereals and on meat. The workers 
uprising of 1886 made tariffs on bread grains politically unfeasible. As such, 
agricultural interests thereafter focussed their efforts on the protection of agricultural 
sectors which generated a higher added value and were more suited to the fragmented 
Belgian agricultural structure, such as livestock farming and diary production. In 1887 
and 1895, two protectionist laws were voted which installed tariffs on respectively 
livestock and on a broad range of products, including some agricultural products such 
as flour, canned products (meat, fish, vegetables and fruit), butter and margarine 
(excluding all cereals but oats). This move towards protection reflected the 
protectionist faction gaining ground within the Catholic party. Although the Catholic 
party was a key force in the Belgian liberalization of agricultural trade between the 
1850s and 1873, it was also within this party that the agricultural interests’ cry for 
renewed protection found the most sympathetic ears. With the extension of voting 
rights, the votes of the farmers became a major source of competition among the 
different political parties. Under these electoral pressures, the Catholic party proved 
most successful in building an agricultural ideology which put agriculture in the 
spotlight as a cornerstone of society, thus securing the farmer’s votes. By the end of 
the nineteenth century, the Catholic party had established itself as the single protector 
 29 
of agricultural interests. The growing importance of agricultural interests in electoral 
terms together with the demands of the textiles industry for protection shifted the 
balance of power within the Catholic party and resulted in the adoption of trade 
protection in 1887 and 1895.  
Our results also suggest that the pressures on Catholic MP’s to profile themselves as 
defenders of agricultural interests were less pronounced in constituencies where the 
opposition against the Liberal school policy had been more intense and where 
Catholic Representatives had already built a solid electoral basis on the defence of the 
position of religion in education and society.  
A remarkable conclusion is that interest based explanations work much better in the 
study of late nineteenth century agricultural trade policy in Europe than for the study 
of the repeal of the Corn Laws in the middle of the century. Here, it is important to 
take one qualitative element into consideration. The main political discussion between 
1815 and 1850 was who would lose or gain from free trade in agricultural products. It 
was clear that the landowners would stand to lose, that industrialists would gain, but 
the effect on the real incomes of the laborers was much less clear. The lasting legacy 
of these political debates was not so much a (reversible) free trade policy, but a shared 
mental blueprint for the interpretation of the effects of tariffs.  
 
Appendix	  
Figure 10: Probit marginal effects (at mean) with constituency interests only 
 
Dependent variable: Protectionist vote 
 
 1885a 1885b 1887 1895 
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cerealr 1.30 0.56 2.69*** 4.17*** 
 (0.90) (0.73) (0.76) (1.03)  
ln(livestock) 0.018 0.18 0.78*** -0.12  
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.19) (0.18)  
popden -0.24*** -0.21*** -0.29*** -0.20*** 
 (0.052) (0.046) (0.048) (0.045)  
proindr -2.55* -0.33 1.05 -5.64*** 
 (1.46) (0.95) (0.81) (1.37)  
protexr -1.82* -0.80 -1.46** -0.16  
 (1.03) (0.83) (0.73) (0.88)  
Studcatr -0.63 0.19 1.54*** -0.038  
 (0.50) (0.38) (0.47) (0.51)  
N 92 103 123 142 
pseudo R-sq 0.48 0.31 0.48 0.58  
 
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses 
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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1 We do not use the framework of King (1997) to analyse the elections of 1884, 1886 and 1894 as 
Lehman (2010) did. Such approach is inappropriate to our setting because the elections were dominated 
by several political issues and because all parties voted dividedly on the tariffs issue. 
2 We have also included Daens, single Representative of the Christian Workers’ party in this category, 
because the agricultural program of Daens was highly similar to that of the Socialist party. See 
Craeybeckx (1973, 224) on this issue.  
3 The categories indicated by the personal background variables are not mutually exclusive. Teachers 
and university professors are for instance included in both PERINTEL and PERPUB, and can also be 
included in PERAGT, e.g. because of being large landowners.  
4 For the results reported in this section, we have selected the functional forms which provided the best 
fit to the data from the set of historically meaningful and interesting specifications and under the 
constraint that the reported results are robust to alterations in functional form and variable selection. 
5 One could argue that the personal economic background of a Representative is similarly co-
determined by the interests of his constituency. However, this does not generate particular 
interpretation (or estimation) problems, and is not intrinsically different from multicolinearity issues at 
the level of constituency characteristics (for instance correlation between population density and 
industrialization). As a robustness check, the reader can verify in appendix that the marginal effects of 
a probit regression with only constituency interests do not differ much from the coefficients reported in 
Figure 8. 
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